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Abstract 
One of the pillars of the educational voucher system instituted in Chile is that competition 
among schools to attract students would improve the quality of the education provided. Surveys 
have suggested that families rank the distance of the school from their home as the most 
important factor for choosing a school. They also suggest that parents largely ignore the results 
of standardized tests. We use a novel data set which includes measures of the distance between 
homes and schools to analyze the determinants of school choice. Economic theory suggests, and 
the estimations confirm, that parents consider quality of the school and its location when 
choosing schools. The paper quantifies the relevant trade-offs. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Chile introduced a series of pioneering reforms in the last quarter of the past century. 
One of them was the introduction, in 1981, of the educational voucher system. Public 
schools were transferred to municipalities, thus decentralizing primary and secondary 
education. Since then, school administration has been carried out by both public 
(municipalities) and private providers (referred to as administrators) that receive most 
of their funds from State subsidies and, in some cases, from fees paid by parents. The 
state subsidy (voucher) is given according to the number of students who attend classes. 
The decision of which school to attend is left to the parents. 
The system has achieved almost universal coverage, and impressive results in 
terms of increasing the number of schools and their infrastructure. However, by 
international comparisons, its results in terms of quality have been rather disappointing. 
 The Chilean educational system comprises three types of schools: i) Public: 
Administered by municipalities and financed primarily with vouchers; ii) Subsidized: 
Administered by private institutions and financed primarily by vouchers (with small 
additional payments made by parents); and iii) Private: Administered by private 
institutions and financed exclusively by payments made by parents. 
 In terms of enrollment, the share of students attending private schools has remain 
virtually unchanged since 1981, but the enrollment in subsidized schools administered 
privately has increased steadily; thus, decreasing the share of enrollment in public 
schools (Paredes and Pinto, forthcoming).  
 The voucher system was designed assuming that the parents’ right to choose their 
children’s school would cause competition among the schools and improve the quality of 
the education provided. In principle, parents would reject low quality schools, which 
would have a declining number of students, and eventually would be eliminated from the 
market. 
 This line of reasoning has been questioned based on the results of surveys to 
parents conducted by a public institution which is in charge of conducting the 
standardized test to measure the quality of education (SIMCE, Sistema de Medición de 
la Calidad de la Enseñanza). Contrary to similar international surveys (Public Policy 
Forum 1998), less than one percent of the Chilean parents surveyed said that the results 
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of the standardized tests were the most important factor in choosing their children’s 
school. The most frequent response for the most important factor behind the choice of a 
school was its proximity to the house (25.2%). These results have made some analysts 
conclude that the main concern upon choosing a school is location and not quality (e.g. 
Elacqua and Fabrega, 2004; Carnoy, 1998; Carnoy and McEwan, 2000). If correct, it is 
stated that this evidence would undermine a crucial feature that is necessary for 
fostering quality through the voucher system. 
 Several studies seek to determine the factors behind school choice in Chile (e.g. 
Vial, 1998; Sapelli and Vial, 2000; Sapelli and Torche, 2002; Paredes and Pinto, 2008; 
and references therein). Others have focused on determining the effect of school 
competition on educational results (e.g. Hoxby, 1994, 2000, 2005; Hsieh and Urquiola, 
2003; Rothstein, 2004, 2005; Bayer and McMillan, 2005; Lavy, 2005; Sandstrom and 
Bergstrom, 2005; Gallego, 2006; Benguria and Paredes, 2008). Although not 
unanimously, most of these studies suggest that parents tend to choose subsidized and 
private schools over public schools as their income increases, that subsidized and private 
schools tend to perform better than public schools in standardized tests, and that 
competition tends to improve quality. None of these studies explicitly considers the 
location of the schools as a factor determining the choice of the parents.  
 Examples of studies that incorporate distance of the school from the household as 
a factor relevant to the choice of school are Gertler and Glewwe (1989; Peru), Alderman 
et al. (2001; Pakistan), Hastings et al (2006; United States), and Gallego and Hernando 
(2008; Chile). They tend to conclude that both distance and quality are relevant factors.  
 This paper differs from the ones listed above in two dimensions: It constructs a 
data-set that includes more precise measures of distance than the ones used by Gallego 
and Hernando (2008), and it uses a novel specification for addressing the choice of school 
that incorporates distance and quality. It evaluates how important is distance (as 
compared to other factors) by focusing on how parents actually choose schools and not 
on results of surveys that merely enunciate factors that they consider important. 
 The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data-set and presents 
some descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses the econometric framework used to 
evaluate the determinants of the choice of school and reports the results. Finally, Section 
5 concludes. 
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2 The Data 
 
Parents consider several factors when choosing a school for their children. Clearly 
distance from the household is one of them. Measuring distance from the household to 
the schools is not easy as information of both the location of the household and the 
school that a child attends to is required. 
 Administrative records for students that take the standardized tests provide 
information of the results of their tests, characteristics of the school, and socio-economic 
characteristics of the household. However, as the address of the household can not be 
recovered from these records, measures of distance can not be obtained. 
A different route is taken in this paper. CASEN is a household survey taken by 
the Ministry of Planning of Chile on a regular basis. This survey provides detailed 
information of socio-economic characteristics of Chilean households. In the survey, it is 
possible to identify the school that each student was attending at the time. Using this 
information, the precise location of the school can be pinned down. To measure distance 
from the household to the school one needs to identify the location of the household. 
Regretfully this cannot be done, as the survey does not provide a precise address for the 
household surveyed. However, the survey does contain information of the block in which 
the household is located. 
 These blocks can be georeferenced using digital maps provided by the companies 
DICTUC and Mapcity, which cover the entire city of Santiago.1 At the same time, using 
the School Directory 2003 of the Ministry of Education (MINEDUC), which includes all 
of the schools’ addresses, it is possible to georeference 2,310 of the 2,312 schools that 
exist in the 34 counties of Santiago.  
 With the georeference of the block of the household and of the schools, it is 
possible to estimate the Euclidean distance between the centroid of the block and each 
                                                 
1 Even though CASEN is a national survey, digital maps are available only for Santiago and this paper 
concentrates its estimations on households of this city. 
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of the 2,310 schools. We consider this as the distance between the household and each 
school.2 
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics of the students reported as attending 
school in CASEN 2003 that lived in Santiago. The sample is evenly split between males 
and females. Parents of students whose children attend to private and subsidized schools 
have more years of schooling (on average) than those whose children attend municipal 
(public) schools.3 The same can be said in terms of income per capita. Of all the 
students in the sample, 53% attended subsidized schools, almost 34% public schools, and 
13% private schools. 
 
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics by Type of School Administration (Averages) 
Variable Total Municipal Subsidized Private 
Share of women (%) 49.3 48.8 49.5 49.7 
Years of schooling (father) 12.6 10.9 12.5 16.8 
Years of schooling (mother) 12.0 10.5 12.1 15.3 
Income per capita (US$ per month) 228.9 123.7 188.3 656.2 
Share of students (%) 100.0 33.6 53.1 13.3 
 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics (averages) of the distance, quality, and 
availability of different types of schools. Only 17.6% of the students attend to the 
nearest school. The share of students that attend public schools that also go to the 
nearest school is of 24.4%. These shares decrease to 15.5% and 8.9% for students of 
subsidized and private schools respectively. If we consider schools of the same type, 
36.3% of the students of public schools choose the nearest public school, and 24.3% 
                                                 
2 Gallego and Hernando (2008) use a cruder measure distance, as they define it as the Euclidean distance 
between the centroid of the county (comuna) of the household and the school that the child attended. 
3 Information of years of schooling of the father is available only for 78% of the sample. 
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(13.8%) of the students that attend subsidized (private) schools go the nearest school of 
the same type. Thus, choosing the school nearest to the household is not as prevalent as 
the survey suggests. 
 
Table 2 
Distance and Quality by Type of School Administration (Averages) 
Variable Total Municipal Subsidized Private 
Distance of school chosen 
Quality of school chosen 
2.90 
256 
2.57 
240 
2.78 
257 
4.22 
295 
Distance of nearest school  
Quality of nearest school 
0.52 
248 
0.46 
240 
0.55 
246 
0.53 
272 
Distance of nearest municipal school 
Quality of nearest municipal school 
0.90 
232 
0.67 
229 
0.93 
231 
1.34 
246 
Distance of nearest subsidized school 
Quality of nearest subsidized school 
0.78 
254 
0.71 
250 
0.73 
253 
1.15 
266 
Distance of nearest private school 
Quality of nearest private school 
1.92 
286 
2.08 
285 
2.07 
287 
0.95 
287 
Number of schools (2 kms radius) 
Quality of schools (2 kms radius) 
20.8 
255 
21.1 
252 
21.3 
253 
18.2 
270 
Number of municipal schools (2 kms radius) 
Quality of municipal schools (2 kms radius) 
4.4 
241 
5.2 
239 
4.4 
240 
2.2 
254 
Number of subsidized schools (2 kms radius) 
Quality of subsidized schools (2 kms radius) 
13.6 
252 
14.0 
250 
15.3 
252 
6.3 
263 
Number of private schools (2 kms radius) 
Quality of private schools (2 kms radius) 
2.8 
286 
1.9 
285 
1.6 
286 
9.8 
287 
Share of students that attend to: 
    nearest school 
    nearest school of the same type 
 
17.6 
26.9 
 
24.4 
36.3 
 
15.5 
24.3 
 
8.9 
13.8 
Notes: Distance is measured in kilometers; quality is measured as the average score of the students of the 
school on the standardized test. 
 
Table 2 also shows that the average distance between the household and the 
school that the student attends is of 2.9 kilometers. Students of public schools attend 
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schools closer to the household than students that attend subsidized or private schools. 
Nevertheless, on average, irrespective of the type of school, the distance between the 
household and the nearest school is of approximately 0.5 kilometers. In terms of quality, 
as measured by average scores of the school on standardized tests, private schools tend 
to perform better than subsidized schools, and these do better than public schools. 
As Table 1 shows, students of private schools have, on average, higher per capita 
income. Thus, as expected, private schools tend to be more concentrated in areas in 
which students effectively go to private schools. However, households with students 
attending public and subsidized schools are not clustered in areas with different number 
of schools of each type. Furthermore, the average quality of the surrounding schools of 
each type is almost identical regardless of the type of school chosen by the parents. 
 
Figure 1 
Average Distance (in meters) by Age 
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The average distance between the household and the school attended varies with 
the age of the child (Figure 1). The schools chosen are nearer to the household in 
primary education and an almost discrete jump occurs when the student goes to high 
school (around age 15). This feature is related to both, that there are fewer high schools 
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than schools with primary education, and that as age increases, the cost of traveling 
diminishes with age as students are more autonomous. 
 
Figure 2 
Probability of Choosing the Nearest School by Age 
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The same pattern is observed when considering the frequency of cases in which 
students choose the nearest school. Broadly speaking, irrespective of the type of school 
attended, the probability of choosing the nearest school is decreasing in the age of the 
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student. Again, particularly in the case of students attending public and subsidized 
schools, there is an important decline in this probability when the student reaches high 
school. Finally, students of municipal schools choose the nearest school more often. 
This section described the new data base constructed and some stylized facts 
regarding the distance between the household and the school chosen. The next section 
uses this information to evaluate the determinants of the choice of school, including 
distance. 
 
3 The Empirical Model 
 
Parents consider several factors when choosing a school for their children. Some of them 
are specific to each child but common to every possible school selected (such as the age 
of the child, the education of the parents, gender of the child, income of the household, 
or other characteristics of the child or the household). Others correspond to 
characteristics that are specific to each school and are common to every child and 
household (such as the type of school, its quality, its costs, and other characteristics of 
each school). Finally there are other attributes of each choice that are specific to the 
child and the school (most notably, the distance between the household and the school). 
 Let 1, ,i I= …  index the individuals (students) in the sample and 1, ,j J= …  
index the possible choices (schools). Denote by ix  to the vector of characteristics of the 
student and its household that do not depend on the school, by jy  to the vector of 
characteristics of the school that do not depend on the student, and by ,i jz  to the vector 
of attributes of the school that are specific to each student. 
 Define ,i ju  as the (indirect) utility of child i attending school j, such that:  
 ( ), , ,, , ,i j i j i j i ju u x y z ε= +  (1) 
where ( )u ⋅  corresponds to a systematic component and ,i jε  is a (random) non-systematic 
component. 
 Given (1), agent i chooses school h if , ,   .i h i ju u j h≥ ∀ ≠  Given a functional form 
for ( )u ⋅  and a distributional assumption of , ,i jε  parameters can be estimated using 
quasi-maximum likelihood (QML). When each individual has some factors that are 
specific to each choice (such as distance), the empirical literature tends to favor using 
 9
conditional logit models for estimation. The data base consists of 2,310 identified schools 
and 7479 students. Thus, in principle, more than 17 million distances would be needed 
to estimate the model. 
 This paper considers a different approach to evaluate the determinants of the 
choice of school and the relevance of distance. Let , ,i jd  denote the distance between 
household i and school j. Let 
in
d  be the distance between household i and the nearest 
school and 
in
u  the value of the objective function in (1) associated with choosing that 
school. On the other hand, let 
im
u  be the value of the objective function associated to 
the choice of the school that maximizes (1). Note that the school that minimizes ,i jd  and 
the one that maximizes ,i ju  may be different for each student i. Clearly, when the 
nearest school maximizes (1), 
im
u  and 
in
u  will coincide. Finally, let 
 
1 if 
.
0 if 
i i
i i
m n
i
m n
u u
v
u u
⎧ =⎪⎪= ⎨⎪ >⎪⎩
 (2) 
That is, iv  is the (observed) variable that takes the value of 1 when the student attends 
the school nearest to the household and 0 otherwise. 
 Considering (2) instead of (1) is convenient as now we can focus on modeling the 
determinants of choosing the nearest school using binary response models. The model 
considered postulates: 
[ ] ( )Pr 1 ,ii iv w F wβ ′= =  
where F is a postulated distribution function (say the standard normal), iw  is a vector 
of determinants, and β  a vector of parameters to the estimated. 
 The vector of potential determinants considers: 
• Individual or household characteristics: Gender, age, education of the 
father and the mother, and (log of the) income per capita of the household. 
• Characteristics of the nearest school: Quality of the school (average result 
in standardized tests), distance of the nearest school from the household. 
• Characteristics of the school chosen: Quality of the school (average result 
in standardized tests), type of school (municipal, subsidized, private).4 
                                                 
4 It is not necessary to include distance of the school from the household, as this variable along with the 
distance to the nearest school would perfectly forecast v. 
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• Competition: Number of schools in a 2 kilometers radius from the 
household. 
 
Table 3 
Probit Model for Choosing the Nearest School 
Variable Estimate Marginal Effect 
Constant 1.020 (0.0185)  
Gender (1=Woman) 0.034 (0.0029) 0.008 (0.0012) 
Age -0.024 (0.0006) -0.006 (0.0010) 
Older than 14 -0.288 (0.0056) -0.068 (0.0017) 
Schooling of mother -0.016 (0.0004) -0.004 (0.0010) 
Log of Income per capita -0.084 (0.0020) -0.020 (0.0011) 
Quality (school chosen) -0.008 (0.0001) -0.002 (0.0009) 
Quality (nearest school) 0.005 (0.0001) 0.001 (0.0009) 
Distance (nearest school) -0.727 (0.006) -0.171 (0.0018) 
Number of schools -0.009 (0.0002) -0.002 (0.0010) 
Type (1=Public school) 0.152 (0.0034) 0.036 (0.0013) 
Observations=1117132        LogL=83413 [0.00]        Pseudo R2=0.081 
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis. P-value in brackets. 
 
Table 3 presents the results of estimating a probit model for this choice.5 The 
results show that households would (marginally) prefer a closer school of the child if a 
woman. Consistent with the evidence of Figure 1, the model also shows that the older 
the child the lower the probability of choosing the nearest school and that there is a 
discrete decrease in the probability of choosing the nearest school when the student 
attends high school (reaches the age of 15). The model also shows that the probability 
decreases with the income of the household and the education of the mother.6  
                                                 
5 Marginal effects are computed as the average of marginal effects for each observation. 
6 Models that also include the education of the father have similar results and are available upon request. 
However, as there are many missing values on this variable, we report the results of using only the 
education of the mother. 
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 Increasing the number of schools near the household decreases the probability of 
attending the nearest school. As would be expected, households are more likely to choose 
the nearest school when its quality is higher or it is closer. Thus, as economic theory 
predicts, the model shows that there is indeed a trade-off between quality and distance 
that parents consider. Consistently, the more quality has the school chosen, the less 
likely is that the student would attend the nearest school. Finally, as shown in Figure 2, 
students attending public schools are more likely to attend the nearest school. Apart 
from the discrete variables (high school or municipal schools), the marginal effects show 
that distance and quality are also economically relevant factors for choosing schools.  
  
Table 4 
Probit Model for Choosing the Nearest School (Public Schools) 
Variable Estimate Marginal Effect 
Constant 3.589 (0.0432)  
Gender (1=Woman) 0.075 (0.0046) 0.023 (0.0018) 
Age -0.043 (0.0007) -0.013 (0.0010) 
Schooling of mother -0.006 (0.0007) -0.002 (0.0010) 
Log of Income per capita -0.067 (0.0034) -0.021 (0.0015) 
Quality (school chosen) -0.024 (0.0002) -0.007 (0.0009) 
Quality (nearest school) 0.014 (0.0002) 0.004 (0.0009) 
Distance (nearest school) -0.718 (0.0060) -0.223 (0.0023) 
Number of school -0.050 (0.0007) -0.016 (0.0010) 
Observations=371184        LogL=78150 [0.00]        Pseudo R2=0.162 
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis. P-value in brackets. 
 
The model is estimated considering all the students. It may be argued that 
parents that choose (say) a public school are less likely to consider a private school as a 
close substitute. Tables 4, 5, and 6 present the results of estimating probit models in 
which the samples are split between types of schools (public, subsidized and private) and 
consider the characteristics of the nearest school and the number of schools of the same 
type in a 2 kilometers radius as the only valid alternatives. 
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Table 5 
Probit Model for Choosing the Nearest School (Subsidized Schools) 
Variable Estimate Marginal Effect 
Constant 0.632 (0.0274)  
Gender (1=Woman) 0.068 (0.0037) 0.020 (0.0016) 
Age -0.008 (0.0008) -0.002 (0.0011) 
Older than 14 -0.486 (0.0070) -0.140 (0.0024) 
Schooling of mother -0.018 (0.0006) -0.005 (0.0011) 
Log of Income per capita -0.085 (0.0026) -0.025 (0.0014) 
Quality (school chosen) -0.005 (0.0001) -0.002 (0.0011) 
Quality (nearest school) 0.006 (0.0001) 0.002 (0.0011) 
Distance (nearest school) -0.686 (0.0053) -0.197 (0.0020) 
Number of school -0.019 (0.0002) -0.005 (0.0011) 
Observations=591641        LogL=46556 [0.00]        Pseudo R2=0.072 
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis. P-value in brackets. 
 
Table 6 
Probit Model for Choosing the Nearest School (Private Schools) 
Variable Estimate Marginal Effect 
Constant 0.296 (0.0610)  
Older than 14 -0.189 (0.0097) -0.039 (0.0031) 
Schooling of mother -0.047 (0.0012) -0.010 (0.0024) 
Log of Income per capita -0.154 (0.0051) -0.032 (0.0026) 
Quality (school chosen) -0.003 (0.0002) -0.001 (0.0024) 
Quality (nearest school) 0.005 (0.0002) 0.001 (0.0024) 
Distance (nearest school) -0.205 (0.0048) -0.043 (0.0026) 
Number of school -0.004 (0.0005) -0.001 (0.0024) 
Observations=154307        LogL=7314 [0.00]        Pseudo R2=0.059 
Notes: Standard deviations in parenthesis. P-value in brackets. 
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Regardless of the type of school, the results are broadly consistent with what was 
presented in Table 3. However, there are also some differences. The number of 
surrounding schools and the distance of the nearest school are less important for 
choosing the nearest school for private and subsidized schools than for public schools. 
The same can be said regarding the quality of the chosen and nearest school. However, 
income and education are more important factors for choosing school in private and 
subsidized schools than in public schools. 
The panels of Figure 3 show how changes in different factors affect the 
probability of choosing the nearest school of each type.7 The quality of the nearest school 
is more important in municipal school than in the others. The same can be said in terms 
of distance up to approximately 1.5 kilometers. Although the probability of choosing the 
nearest school decreases with income for all the students, it does so at a slower pace for 
students of public schools. Having more options available near the house is also more 
important for students of municipal and subsidized schools. 
Table 7 uses the marginal effects obtained in Tables 4-6 to derive the rates of 
substitution between quality of the nearest school and other factors. The first row 
measures the willingness to pay for one additional point in the score of the standardized 
test of the nearest school. According to the results, quality is highly valued by the 
families attending to any school. This is particularly clear when we consider that SIMCE 
scores has a standard deviation of 50, and that despite an increase in 400% of the budget 
devoted to education in the period 1990-2008, no change in the average Simce is 
observed. The last row shows how much (on average) would a student by willing to 
“walk” for an additional point in the average score of the nearest school. 
                                                 
7 The probabilities were evaluated in the means of the independent variables corresponding to each 
sample. Then the variable to be considered was modified. 
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Figure 3 
Probability of Choosing the Nearest School by Type of School 
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Table 7 
Marginal Rates of Substitution between Different Factors  
Change Municipal Subsidized Private 
US$ x 1 point 0.81 0.93 0.97 
Meters x 1 point 20 9 25 
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4 Concluding Remarks 
 
Although Chile is the country where the educational voucher system is most widely 
used, its evaluation has been limited. In fact, many of the recommendations come from 
anecdotal evidence including surveys such as the one that suggests that people do not 
consider the quality of education at the moment of choosing a school and consequently 
that the system does not provide incentives for competition. 
 We used a new data base that accurately estimate the distance between the 
household and school to test how important are location and quality when choosing 
schools. We show that both dimensions are relevant determinants of this choice and 
quantify the implied trade-offs. 
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